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“Success in Banking is attained not by avoiding risk but by effectively selecting and managing risk” 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
There is an empirical evidence, which justify the core functioning of money in economic growth 
and the development of a State, which equally establishes the reason of the relevant role of 
Banks to every economy. The underpinning of this research, is to present the necessity for the 
financial industry of undeveloped and developing economies very fragile in their functioning, to 
adopt the proposed theoretical perspective of dynamic credit risk analysis and lending, as an 
upgrade model over the existing static risk analytical approach, found to be inefficient in credit-
lending-support to the productiveness of enterprises, emerging from such economies, hence 
creating frustration to the welfare nature of the State and heightening it unemployment 
tension.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In other for the paper to deeply establish the bases of it argument, with quality submission of 
theoretical analysis. Some relevant terminology used herein, lacking precise definition in the 
taxonomy of economic science, has to be defined in the context of this paper based on critical 
assessment of varied definition adopted by scholars in the social science community. And these 
terms are as follows; 
i.  Fragile Economy 
ii. Credit Analysis & Risk 
 
i. Fragile Economy 
 
It is a term argued to have been coined by Morgan Stanley in 2013, representing an emerging 
market economies that are too dependent on unreliable foreign investment to finance growth 
ambitions. Bruce & Jennifer (2013) defined fragile economy as a National economic network to 
venerable metropolitan economies, consisting of networks of innovative firms, talented 
workers, risk-taking entrepreneurs, supportive Institution and associations that cluster together 
in metropolitan areas and co-produce economic performance and progress. Demirek (2009), 
almost like the intent of the originator of the word, defined fragile economy as an environment 
where it firms rely heavily on external funds to finance its operational costs. 
 
However in respect of this paper, fragile economy will be defined as, an economy, experiencing 
a significant weaknesses in it currency, making it difficult to finance it account deficits and 
growth projects, contributing to a slow down and vulnerability in it welfare functioning. 
 
There are numerous factors known to cause economic fragility of a State, for instance, weak 
political institution, poor constitution functionality, poor governance, poor financial industrial 
policies, bad tax regulations, high cost of having a strong balance sheet as an enterprises in an 
economy, poorly developed investment market, high inflationary effect, complex bureaucracy, 
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capital adequacy of banks, and finally in respect of this paper, corruption. All the listed factors 
will be extensively diagnosed to establish it significant contribution to a fragile economy and 
negative impact on Enterprises existence. Which will guide in analyzing the effectiveness of the 
use of Static-credit-risk-analysis for potential profitable Enterprises that emerge from such 
economies, struggling to survive. 
 
ii. Credit Analysis & Risk 
 
Kagan(2018) defined credit analysis, as a type of analysis that an investor or bond portfolio 
manager performs on  companies or debt issuing entities, to measure the entity’s ability to 
meet it debt obligations. Which the content and the argumentative direction of this paper, will 
concur with the above definition to establish the bases of it theoretical analysis.  Banks remain 
a major conduit for the transformation of Savings into productive investments. And much 
particular in emerging countries where capital markets are still not sufficiently developed and 
where savers have limited access to direct-credit-risk-opportunities. Jonathan & Philippe (2013) 
state, Banks and Financial Systems should share the blame with profligate politicians, outdated 
socioeconomic models and a shift of the world’s center of gravity towards new comers in the 
financial-economic warfare. And further argued Banks cannot survive unless they take risks. 
The trick for them is to manage those risks without destroying shareholders value. The fatter 
the better, from credit worthiness point of view and without endangering depositors and 
creditors. It must be acknowledged, financial intermediaries like Banks do carry substantial 
credit and market risks. They act as the shock absorbers by removing it from their depositors’ 
shoulders and charging hefty fee for the services. 
 
It is observed, no individual with money to spare, that is Savings or Capital, will provide credit 
on a commercial basis, unless she believes that the borrower has both the requisite willingness 
and capacity to repay the funds, advanced. To form such believe rationally, she must be 
satisfied that, the two questions can be answered in affirmative. Which are; 
 
 4  
a) The prospective borrower will be willing, so long as the obligation exists, to repay it? 
b) The prospective borrower will be able to repay the obligation, when required under its 
terms? 
 
To respond to these questions, a credit analysts will re-sought to a judgment of probability. 
Banks acceptance of credit risk is inherent to their operations, since the very reason of 
existence as banks, is the supply of credit through the advance of cash and the corresponding 
creation of financial obligations. 
 
Credit Risk in the perspective of this paper will be defined as, the risk of money loss arising from 
the default of a counterparty on a fundamental financial obligation or higher than expected loss 
of severity, arising from a lower than expected exposure at the time of default. The following is 
a formulated assessment of credit risk in the framework of this paper assumed as the generally 
accepted tradition of the banking industry: 
 
a. Examining the obligator’s capacity and willingness to repay credit 
b. The country risk and operational conditions as in it macroeconomic climate that the 
obliged is exposed to. 
c. Examining the attributes of obligation from which the credit risk arises in the instance of 
legal or derivative risk and character of currency. 
d. Assessing the credit risk and mitigation such as collateral utilization, pledges, guarantees 
and insurance. 
 
The concern herein is not the underlying probability of default but the degree of uncertainty 
associated with forecasting this probability. As Hale (1983) succinctly put across, if the pawn 
broker lends money against a gold watch, he does not need credit analysis. He needs instead to 
know the price of the gold watch in respect to time. The Traditional Credit analysts of the 
banking sector are best known of sieving through quantum of data ranging from cash flows, 
credit history, in its ratio and trend analysis to draw a probability line in terms of exposure to 
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default, the recovery rate and the loss given default. Which this style of credit analysis is 
modeled as structural and reduced form. The [structural model] considers the positions of 
stakeholders of the company, while the [reduced-form model] seek to predict, when a default 
may occur based on observable variables. Which the theoretical construct of this paper in 
conclusion seek to critique against the stringent application of this model in fragile economy 
due to it questionable effectiveness and reliability observed over a decades in such economy, 
hence provide alternative model as a theoretical perspective. 
 
2. OBSERVED FACTORS CONSIDERED TO CONTRIBUTE TO FRAGILE ECONOMY 
 
Even though, there is observed wide range of factors identified to contribute significantly to the 
cause of fragile economy, this paper narrow the analysis of the observable factors and variables 
affecting the potential effective functioning of a productive Enterprises in credit wise and it 
related financial industry. Which are; 
I. Weak Governance and Political Institution 
II. Poor constitutional functionality 
III. Poor developed investment market 
IV.  Bureaucracy  
V. Corruption 
VI. Banks capital adequacy  
 
I. Weak Governance and Political Institution 
 
It was suggested by Adji et.al (1997) as well as Feng & Chen (1997) that a political government, 
which is an active economic participant, can positively intervene to shape an environment to 
attract investment. They further argue that, lower political capacity, indicate less ability to 
extract resources, which critically implies higher budget deficits and an increase in uncertainty. 
Finally, they observed that, faced with low capacity, a country is more likely to create new taxes 
or increase existing ones, thereby reducing the return on investments. Which sum up to the 
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fact that capable government align their policies with sound macroeconomics criteria, while 
weak governments stress political survival and mostly exposed to challenges, which act as a 
huge frustration to Enterprise survival in such economy. When political Institution formed is 
captured as an ideological gloss through which the minority who exercise real power through 
the State and it monopoly, seek to conceal this fact from the subject population as Lenin 
(1917), did put it in his paper the State and Revolution, then the Institution become hopeless in 
it function denied in it expected benefit to its members, than to serve the interest of the 
political elite. In such a circumstance, Enterprises not engaging in cronyism, suffocate in a 
smooth and successful growth in such economy as observed from this studies. 
 
II. Poor Constitutional Functionality 
 
In an economic environment, where the legitimacy of the State, the nature of its authority  and 
the nature of its obligations to its citizens and of its citizens to it, lack clarity, with the 
constitution functioning not as the rule of law but the rule of men ruled by subjective and 
arbitrary  will of particular men instead of objective determinant of general and public laws, as 
Kant (1724-1804) asserted, for a strong constitution, is a union of an aggregate of men under 
rightful law. In such a circumstance, the labour of men through their enterprises to serve the 
market as well as to generate private property are easily undermined, and mischievously 
destroyed in the spirit of plundering, which weaken the spirit of innovation, creativity and 
sacrifice through entrepreneurship for economic growth, a major challenge faced by 
Enterprises in fragile economy, as observed from this studies. 
 
III. Poor developed Investment Market 
 
Poor developed investment market could be defined as an economic environment, whereby 
either bank-based or market-based financial system are poorly developed in promoting long-
run economic growth. Stiglitz (1985) submit that, well developed markets quickly and publicly 
reveal information, which reduces the incentives for individual investors to acquire information. 
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While Boot et.al (1993) indicate, Banks reveal of information is slow to public due to it long run 
relationship with firms, however with Boot & Thakor (1997) added to the debate that, a 
coordinated coalitions of investors with Bank is better than uncoordinated with the market, 
where monitoring firms and reducing post-lending moral hazards is weak. Bhide (1993) also 
posit that, liquid markets hold a myopic investor climate, making bank-based system a 
preferable in policy guide and theoretical practice. So in fragile economy whereby both the 
Bank-based and Market-based financial system are underdeveloped, causes visionary 
enterprises to struggle in productivity and smooth growth. Further observed from this studies 
that in such environment, investors assume there is a high risk to invest in private sector of 
such economy, which the sector is known to be holding the highest volume of macroeconomic 
contribution and performance of the State. And if, it is considered by Investors as a secured 
environment to support, that is the private sector, then it has to be politically guaranteed in 
such economy, a process that slows economic growth and innovations by private hands. 
 
IV. Bureaucracy 
 
As Niskanen Jr. (1990) argued, a large part of our population wants to expand the role of 
government particularly to alleviate poverty and improve the environment, correspondingly 
large part of our population is exasperated by the methods of bureaucracy and dissatisfied by 
its performance, just as Max Weber (1864-1920) recognized bureaucracy as the characteristic 
form of public administration for a State with extended territorial sovereignty developed, what 
has become the standard definition of this form of organization in our contemporary times. Von 
Mises book bureaucracy, had established relevant information, he argued, ‘bureaus’ specialized 
in the supply of those services, the value of which cannot be exchanged for money at per-unite 
rate.  As a consequence of the above, ‘bureaus’ cannot be managed by profit goals and the 
economic calculus and therefore must be centrally managed by the pervasive regulation and 
monitoring of the activities of subordinates with the absolute solution, to reduce the scope of 
government.  Enterprise success in both endogenous and exogenous climate of a State depends 
much on strategic exploitation of opportunities in respect to time. In an advent of competition, 
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time become a valuable commodity to take advantage of, which fragile economy drawn in 
complex bureaucracy, lacking respect to time and speed of the market development as a result 
of a system architecturally designed to serve self-interest and political elite, downplaying the 
struggle of an entrepreneurs effectiveness and Enterprise efficiency is observed to be the major 
cause of venture collapsing in such economies. 
 
V. Corruption 
 
Olken & Pande (2012) posits that, survey evidence suggest that corruption is rampant in the 
developing world and more prevalent in developing countries than in rich ones and justify 
further, there is a situation where ‘bureaucrats’ official salaries were less than their market 
wage in expectation of the corrupt rents, they would obtain. Mocan (2008) finds that, the 
income and education of the individual have positive impacts in the likelihood of being asked 
for bribe in developing countries. There is an Instances, reported by Reinikka & Svensson 
(2004), using public expenditure tracking survey, they compared the amount of special 
education block grant sent down from the Central government of Uganda, with the amount of 
the Block grant received by the schools. They estimated a leakage rate of 87%.  Another 
instance, which Olken (2007) report of a rural road projects. He compares the official amount 
spent on the road to an independent engineers, estimate of what the road actually cost to 
build, in which engineers dug core sample of the roads to estimate material quantities, did price 
surveys to estimate local prices, and interviewed villagers  to estimate actual wages paid, it was 
realized, some amount of materials disappeared during construction.  And an estimated missing 
expenditures in respect of the village claim and the engineering estimation to the promoted 
cost was approximately 24% per average. Olken & Pande (2012) did further argue that, 
corruption lessens the government’s ability to correct an externality. If someone can bribe a 
police officer or a judge instead of paying an official fine, the marginal cost of breaking the law 
is reduced from the official fine to the amount of the bribe. Furthermore argued, if the police 
officer extracts the same bribe regardless of whether the person has broken the law, the 
marginal cost of breaking the law falls to zero, and the law ceases to have a disincentive effect 
 9  
altogether. An environment which has a strong networks of corruption driven in complex 
innovations, any honest transactions, which should be the hallmark of any successful and 
credible enterprise, becomes difficult, as a result, a long term progression of such a venture in 
competing against it counterpart in  strong economic environment becomes questionable. 
 
VI. Capital Adequacy of Banks 
 
In the studies of Inoue et.al (2019) on lending behaviour of Banks, they submitted, when a 
substantial adverse shocks hits the economy and many borrowers become insolvent and banks 
face impaired capital, there is a two types of lending behaviour observed, which are, stagnant 
lending in a capital crunch and forbearance lending.  With the stagnant lending in a capital 
crunch, the banks decrease credit to borrowers, irrespective of whether they are good or bad 
borrowers. While that of Forbearance lending, the banks conduct window-dressing to avoid the 
realization of capital losses and thus allocate more credit to insolvent borrowers, with the hope 
that their situations will improve with the premise that, the impaired banks adopt this lending 
behaviour as a considerable effort to avoid further deterioration of their balance sheets. In 
practice, it implies the stagnant lending in a capital crunch involves the issue of overall credit 
undersupply to all borrowers. Whereas forbearance lending involves the issue of credit 
allocation to low-quality borrowers. As the spirit of this paper seeks to promote a lending 
model very effective in fragile economy, this implies it requires a very vibrant banking industry, 
which Diamond (1984) and Calomiris & Wilson (2004), arguing within models of banking under 
asymmetric information have all emphasized the potential conflict of interest between banks 
and depositors. And such an informational problem, encourages the banks to offer short-term-
low-risk debt, concentrating most in the balance sheet risk of their capital and thus insulating 
depositors from this risk. Therefore it is important to determine whether banks are well 
capitalized enough to absorb their balance sheet risk and stabilize the banking system. Since 
the theoretical preposition of the paper on dynamic-credit-risk analysis and lending is 
established on the premise of a vibrant banking sector of a fragile economy, then rise a debate 
of, what are the signals of an economy to serve as a predictive power for Bank failures.  
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Haldane (2014) and Bulow & Klemperer (2015) pointed out that regulatory measures of Bank 
Capital do not necessarily have predictive power for Bank failures. Empirically, Haldane & 
Madouros (2012) and Sarin and Summers (2016) measured Bank risk using both regulatory 
measures and market measures. And realized, the market measures, which is defined as the 
Capital ratio in the value of equity relations to total assets has the most explanatory power in 
predicting banks failure, than regulatory measures of bank capital in respect to Basel accord. 
The limitation of this paper was to ignore the theoretical factors that causes vibrancy to bank 
operations in fragile economy and relied on how effective credit-lending will be achieved for a 
smooth industrial progression. Which we believe further studies in the recommended area, 
could explore this factors metrically. 
 
3. DYNAMIC CREDIT RISK ANALYSIS & LENDING MODEL  
 
This section of the paper seeks to analyzed the exiting model of credit-risk-analysis termed as 
Model ‘E’ by this paper and establish the empirical evidence of it inefficiency in fragile economy 
and the preposition of an upgrade model termed by this paper as Model ‘D’ to address the 
weaknesses of model ‘E’ application in fragile economy. In the theoretical settings of model ‘E’, 
it is observed in practical experience that, the tool is applicable to Enterprises having a historic 
operational existences, hence used three (3yrs) as the average data qualification used by the 
financial industry as a criteria for credit application and approval. Any Enterprise chosen to be 
analyzed on the scale of probability in credit-risk-analysis, should meet the following conditions 
as parameters 
i. The Enterprise is assured of profitability 
ii. The Enterprise has passed credibility test 
iii. The Enterprise has a successful historical data of operational performance. 
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Fig. A1.  Model ‘E’ 
 
                                                                                             E. T. Senzu (2019), Credit-Lending- risk analysis model structure 
 
The empirical efficiency of Model ‘E’, passing through an evaluation test as an Old Static 
Banking approach in credit-risk-analysis of the following chosen countries, as a sample frame of 
a fragile economies used, were; 
1.  Ghana 2. Nigeria 3. Uganda 4. Liberia 5. Zimbabwe 
A total of two hundred (200) companies were contacted, all from the five chosen countries as a 
case study approach in respect to Best and Kaln (1998), as they argue that, case study probes 
deeply and analyzed interactions between factors that explain present status or influence 
change. The size of the sample, which was  two hundred (200) companies, was believed  by the 
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researcher as sufficient  enough to be a good inference as Fink and Kosecoff (1995) posit, the 
size of a population from which the sample of a particular size is drawn has virtually no impact 
on how well a sample is likely to describe a population. Finally Fowler (1993) did also assert, a 
sample size of one hundred and fifty (150) respondents could describe a population of fifteen 
thousand (15,000) or five hundred million (5,000,000) with virtually the same degree of 
accuracy, assuming all other aspects of the design and sampling procedure were the same.  
 
This two hundred (200) companies selected were based on their application for credit facility in 
the period of 2018 October to 2019, January from the Financial Institutions of their choice, with 
their request processed at the time when the research studies was on-going. Therefore Figure 
A2 below define the structural component of the Enterprises surveyed as a sample frame. 
Fig. A2 
 
                                                                                                                                       E. T. Senzu, 2019; field Report 
To be able to complete the empirical testing of the Model ‘E’ efficiency in the chosen fragile 
economies, the following question was asked 
 
Q1. How many of the companies, had their credit facility approved among the two hundred 
companies who applied for it?  The findings were tabled as Table X1 
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Table X1 
 
                                                                                                                                                       E. T. Senzu, 2019; field Report. 
 
A total of two hundred (200) companies, which applied for the credit facility as 100% sample 
frame work, with the response presented above. It was observed, only 15% out of the two 
hundred (200) loan applications were considered for credit facility approval, by going through 
Model ‘E’ Credit-Risk-Analysis and Lending framework, as it has always been, the traditional 
banking approach. Which empirically justify the argument of this paper of the inefficiency of 
the use of Model ‘E’ in fragile economy.  To further examine the cause of it weaknesses as a 
traditional banking model, another question was asked to the respondents. 
 
Q2. Why were you disqualified, despite meeting the parametric conditions stated above, as the 
Enterprise being profitable, credible and has historical data of operational performance?  
Findings were tablized as X2, below. 
        Table X2. 
                               Reasons behind Credit disqualification 
                                                                             
                                                                                                                                            E. T. Senzu, 2019; field report 
Types of Companies  Percentage of Company Size (%) Granted Credit Facility (%) 
Corporate Companies & 
Multinationals  8%    4%  
Medium Scale Enterprise   27%    8%  
Small Scale Enterprise   41%    3%  
Micro Scale Enterprise   24%    0%  
     100%    15%  
           
 
     
Response       Rate 
1 
Credit history suffered discrepancies with the reason of most, to 
avoid tax burden 34% 
2 
A weak economic environment due to weak governance 
capacity  22% 
3 Weak collateralization and guarantors     12% 
4 
High Interest rate, making the credit facility 
disinteresting   15% 
5  Unreliable location of the Enterprises     2% 
         85% 
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Even though, at the exposure to the empirical evidence, it indicated the targeted respondents 
had more than one reason to be denied of credit facility by these banks, however the study 
rather dwell much on the core factor among the list of factors in respect to the companies to be 
denied the credit facility. With this studies, it has empirically justified, that most of the causes, 
resulting to disqualification of Enterprises credit accessibility, falls within Model ‘E’ framework 
in Credit-Risk-Analysis, which the paper seeks to advance this model theoretically as Model ‘D’ 
framework of Credit-Risk-Analysis that will be efficient tool for fragile economy to the benefit of 
Enterprise developers in such regions. With the Model ‘D’ framework labeled as Fig. A3 
Fig. A3. 
 
                                                                                         E. T. Senzu (2019) Model D- Credit-Lending-risk analysis structure                                                                                                                                    
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The above Model ‘D’ as shown by Fig. A3 as a Credit-Risk-Analysis and Lending tool, is uphold as 
dynamic and relatively efficient in it structural implementation comparable to Model ‘E’ as 
shown at Fig. A1, because it takes into consideration the triggers of fragile economy that 
counter a smooth and innovative growth of Enterprises of such economy under financial 
constraint. The Model ‘D’ stresses it analytical tool on the parametric qualification of the 
Enterprises, if such is met, whatever identified risk, will mitigate it for an easy credit 
accessibility for Enterprise progressive functioning.  However the weakness of Model ‘D’ Credit-
risk-analysis and lending, is it inability to asses start-up ventures having zero years of historical 
performance. Which the paper further postulate Model ‘S’ to replace Model ‘D’ in Enterprise 
funding, when the Venture is in a quixotic stage. 
 
For a State to adopt Model ‘S’, then the government of such a fragile economy, should have an 
interest of private sector empowerment as an engine of it economic growth, while it 
innovatively channel most of it graduates student into entrepreneurship; the paper proposed 
that the model ‘S’ will require a central Institution termed as [SME-EXIM-BANK] enacted by Law 
in it operational existence and source of funding, generated by Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) 
to guide successful implementation of the model. With the ultimate parametric qualification of 
venture proposal is to prove it significant contribution to Gross domestic production (GDP) of 
such economy, with a spirit of nationalistic interest.  Then with the model framework shown 
below as Fig. A4, will be applicable. 
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Fig.4 Model ‘S’ 
 
                                                                                       E. T. Senzu (2019) model ‘S’ credit-lending-risk analysis structure 
 
4. RELEVANCY OF STUDIES 
 
Over the years there is a general impression created by literatures of political economics of 
developing countries, arguing in favour of supremacy of the fiscal policies being an effective 
tools of government, dictating the success of a welfare state. Which this paper seeks to critique 
the exuberant of such ideological positioning and prove that, beyond fiscal policy interventions 
of government, an exceptional attention of government need to be paid on vibrancy of it 
Banking system in the area of credit lending to Enterprises in fragile economies or else the hope 
of a welfare state will fail as time elapses, which is justified below, mathematically. 
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[𝐵𝑡
?̇?] − − − −𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 
[?̇?𝑝𝑡] − − − 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 
[?̇?𝑡
𝑐𝑙] − − −  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 
[𝐶?̇?𝑡
𝑛] − − − 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 
[𝐶?̇?𝑡
𝑛] − − − 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 
 [?̇?] − − − − 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
[?̇?] − − − − 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟  
[𝐺𝑃] − − − −𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 
[𝑒𝑞] − − − −𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
[𝑊𝐹] − − − −𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 
It is assumed that, it a fragile Economy with a constant government fiscal policy intervention 
Then; 
[?̇?𝑡
𝐾] = 𝐺𝑃 [(?̇?𝑝𝑡) (?̇?𝑡
𝑐𝑙) ] − − − − − − − −𝐸𝑞. 1 
 
[?̇?𝑝𝑡] =  [𝑒
𝑞] + [𝐶?̇?𝑡
𝑛] − − − − − − − −𝐸𝑞. 2 
 
[𝑊𝐹] = 𝐺𝑃 [(?̇?𝑝𝑡) + (𝐶?̇?𝑡
𝑛)] − − − − − − − 𝐸𝑞. 3 
 
[𝐶𝐶𝑡
𝑛̇ ] = [(𝑤)̇ ( ?̇?)] − − − − − − − − − 𝐸𝑞. 4  
 
                             [?̇?𝑝𝑡] =  
1
𝐺𝑃
 [(?̇?𝑡
𝐾|?̇?𝑡
𝑐𝑙)] − − − − − − − − − − − −𝐸𝑞. 5 
 
 Eq.4 and Eq.5 inserted into Eq.3 to produce Eq.6 
 
                                        [𝑊𝐹] = [( 
?̇?𝑡
𝐾
?̇?𝑡
𝑐𝑙 )(𝑤)
̇ (?̇? )] ----------------------------------Eq.6 
                                       [𝑊𝐹] = ( ?̇? ?̇? ?̇?𝑡
𝐾)] / [?̇?𝑡
𝑐𝑙]-----------------------Eq.7 
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The final derivation concludes and justify that, for every welfare state, beyond government 
fiscal policy intervention, it requires a well-capitalized Banking system, strong purchasing power 
of currency, a good wage rate and high credit lending rate as proven by the equation (7), which 
comes with a quality credit-lending-models to be used by the banks. Such has be the focus of 
this paper, specifically on crediting-lending-models very effective as a theoretical proposed 
models to be adopted by banks in fragile economies. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
There are three models, which the paper has presented, beginning with the old traditional 
Credit-Risk-Analytics of the financial industry, mostly the banking sector, with the first model 
defined by this paper as Model ‘E’ with it weaknesses of application explored in fragile 
economies. As a result, the paper theoretically postulate an advanced version of the credit-risk-
analysis of model ‘E’ and termed it as Model ‘D’ and ‘S’ exhibited above for efficient application 
in fragile economy, depending on the ‘life-span’ of the venture, either three (3) years and more 
of productive existence or Zero (0) year productive existence in other words, a venture in an 
idealistic stage. 
 
These additional models developed theoretically, is to help widen the risk analytics and 
assessment scope of Enterprises in accessing funds in fragile economy, unlike the straight-
jacket-approach, which denied most potential and successful ventures, the opportunity to 
prove itself, how much it worth and the viability in the short, medium and long term 
productivity, due to financial constraint.  
 
The researcher do recommend, any further research in this area of studies, should focus on 
lending behaviours of Banks in fragile economy, approach and methods to improve its potency 
and sustainability. 
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